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I. Introduction
“Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred 
and fifty years and enjoys a unique place in American heritage.”1  
Baseball is so pervasive in the national culture that it suffices to say 
that “baseball is everybody’s business.”2  Through wars and disasters 
alike, the game survives.  It is amusement to cure the lull of a summer 
day, and salvation in times of sorrow.3 
  J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  The 
author would like to thank his family for their continued love and support, as well as 
Professor James Wagstaffe for his guidance throughout the writing process. 
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Baseball Responds to September 11 Attacks: Silenced Stadiums, NAT’L PASTTIME,
http://www.nationalpastime.com/stitches/september11.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
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Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is an organization that has 
evolved over the years.  What was once a game played by residents of 
small farm towns across the country is now a multi-billion dollar 
industry4 with international ties and ever-expanding exposure.5 
With this transformation, the needs of the game have changed. 
Back in 1922, the United States Supreme Court declared baseball a 
game of exhibitions that was purely a state affair, not interstate 
commerce.6  Almost a century later, it is laughable to think that 
baseball does not consist of interstate commerce, yet its place in the 
judicial framework is still unsettled. 
Currently, there is a growing discrepancy between small-market 
and large-market MLB teams.  In part, the first-year amateur draft 
often fails to steer the most talented players to the worst teams 
because of financial concerns surrounding signing rookies.7  MLB had 
the opportunity to fix this problem with the newest Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).  The purpose of the CBA is to 
create a working environment that strikes a balance between the 
interests of the players and owners.8  The changes to the new CBA 
attempted to curb the spending on rookies by assigning teams 
specified budgets for the first-year amateur draft.9  Although the new 
CBA has made steps in the right direction, MLB should implement a 
hard slotted salary structure in the future to fully transform the 
amateur draft and ultimately improve professional baseball. 
This Note will first give a history of antitrust law, MLB, and MLB 
CBAs.  It will then analyze how antitrust and labor law set the legal 
framework for the first-year amateur draft, the historical problems of 
4. Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RESEARCH, LTD., 
http://www.plunkettresearch.com/sports-recreation-leisure-market-research/industry-
statistics (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (MLB generated $7.2 billion in revenue in 2011). 
5. See generally Benjamin Goss, Taking the Ballgame Out to the World: An Analysis
of the World Baseball Classic as a Global Branding Promotional Strategy for Major League 
Baseball, J. SPORTS ADMIN. AND SUPERVISION 75 (2009), available at 
www.jsasonline.org/home/v1n1/articles/v1i1_goss-article.pdf. 
6. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922). 
7. Peter Toms, Last Week in Bizball: Will Mandatory Slotting Hurt Small Revenue
Franchises, BIZ OF BASEBALL (Feb. 28, 2011) http://bizofbaseball.com (search 
“mandatory slotting”). 
8. Philip Bautista, Congress Says, “Yooou’re Out!!!” to the Antitrust Exemption of
Professional Baseball: A Discussion of the Current State of Player-Owner Collective 
Bargaining and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
445, 456 (2000). 
9. New Labor Deal Faces Major Draft Changes, BASEBALL AMERICA (Nov. 22,
2011) http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2011/2612639.html. 
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the draft, the changes to the current CBA, and the potential 
consequences of the new CBA rules.  It will then propose the 
implementation of a hard slotted salary as a better solution to MLB’s 
current problems.  Finally, this note will offer a conclusion as to the 
likelihood of a hard-slotted salary system being implemented. 
II. Background
A. Antitrust Law and Major League Baseball’s Exemption
With commerce in the United States expanding, Congress passed
the Sherman Act in 1890 to oppose the combination of entities that 
could potentially harm competition.10  The purpose of the Sherman 
Act was not to protect businesses from the working of the market, but 
instead to protect the public from the failure of the market.11  
Congress sought to prevent restraints to free competition in business 
and commercial transactions that restrict production, raise prices, or 
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or 
consumers of goods and services.12  The Sherman Act directs itself not 
against conduct that is competitive, but against conduct that unfairly 
tends to destroy competition itself.13 
Although baseball has been nationally popular since its creation, 
the Court held that the formation of a baseball league did not 
constitute an attempt to monopolize as defined by the Sherman Act.14  
In Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs, the Court stated that baseball was a business of 
“giving exhibitions,” which were “purely state affairs.”15  At the time, 
the teams that composed the National League were in different cities 
spread across different states.16  The teams played each other in 
“public exhibitions” for money, with one of the teams often crossing a 
state line in order to play the game.17  The fact that individuals on the 
team crossed state lines in order to play many of their games was, in 
the Court’s view, “mere incident” and did not change the character of 
10. William Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI.
L. REV. 221, 221 (1956).
11. Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
12. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
13. McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 458.
14. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922). 
15. Id. at 208.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the business.18  The Court held that the National League was not an 
interference with commerce among the states, and thus professional 
baseball was not subject to the antitrust laws of the Sherman Act.19 
Thirty years later, the Court reaffirmed the Federal Baseball 
holding and declined to overrule its prior decision.20  In Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, the Court held that if there were any problems in 
baseball that warranted the application of antitrust laws, then it 
needed to be addressed by legislation.21  The Court believed that 
Congress had the Federal Baseball decision under consideration, but 
Congress’ lack of legislation was evidence that it chose not to apply 
antitrust laws to professional baseball.22 
Although the Court affirmed the antitrust exemption, Toolson 
emphasized the transformation of baseball’s landscape in America. 
In a dissent that highlighted this transformation, Justice Burton wrote 
that it was a “contradiction in terms” to say that baseball was not 
engaged in interstate commerce within the breadth of the Sherman 
Act.23  He believed baseball was inherently “intercity, intersectional, 
and interstate.”24  He spotted gaps in professional baseball’s 
exemption, such as the Court’s failure in Federal Baseball to state that 
baseball’s activities would still be exempt if the Court found it was 
interstate commerce.25  Additionally, Congress had created neither an 
express nor implied exemption from the Sherman Act for 
professional baseball.26  Although baseball was still exempt, the 
landscape was changing. 
In Flood v. Kuhn, the Court again signaled the need for Congress 
to weigh in on professional baseball.27  In analyzing Federal Baseball 
and Toolson, the Court agreed with the lower court that the 
distinction between baseball and other professional sports that were 
not subject to the exemption was “‘unrealistic,’ ‘inconsistent,’ and 
‘illogical.’”28  Although the Court did not overrule the exemption, it 
held that baseball was a business that was engaged in interstate 
18. Id. at 208–09.
19. Id. at 209.
20. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356 (1953).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 358.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 360.
26. Id. at 364.
27. Flood v. Kahn, 407 U.S. 258, 268 n.9 (1972).
28. Id.
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commerce.29  Additionally, the exemption was confined to baseball 
because of its “unique characteristics and needs,” and did not apply to 
other professional sports operating interstate.30  While the Court did 
not overrule baseball’s exemption created in Federal Baseball, it 
highlighted the desire for Congress to act.31  The Court stated that the 
exemption could only be overturned by legislation, but Congress’ 
“positive inaction” allowed the decision to stand for so long.32 
B. Congress Acts – the Curt Flood Act of 1998
Nearly eight decades after Federal Baseball, Congress addressed
baseball’s antitrust exemption with the Curt Flood Act of 1998.33  The 
Curt Flood Act brought “the rule of antitrust law to baseball.”34  Its 
purpose was to state that MLB players would have the same rights 
under antitrust laws as other professional athletes.35 
The Act is divided into four subsections that define what conduct 
is covered, what is excluded, and who can bring a suit under the Act.36  
The first subsection subjects “conduct, acts, practices, or agreements 
of persons in the business of organized major league baseball directly 
relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players” 
to antitrust laws.37  The second subsection limits the application to 
those actions defined in subsection (a), specifically excluding 
litigation involving franchise relocation, the minor leagues, and “any 
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft.”38  
The third subsection further limits standing to sue under antitrust 
laws to current or former major league baseball players, but 
specifically excludes these players from bringing suit regarding a 
violation of the first-year player draft.39  Overall, the Curt Flood Act 
was specifically targeted at major league baseball players and created 
an exemption for the first year amateur draft. 
29. Id. at 282.
30. Id. at 282–83.
31. Id. at 283–84.
32. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C.S. § 26b (1998).
34. Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 747,
748 (2009) (citing Reynolds Holding, Do Baseball Bigwigs Deserve Special Treatment? 
Why, exactly, should those who already have it easy be further protected by a monopoly?, 
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1998, at SC-5). 
35. 15 U.S.C.S. § 26b(a) (1998).
36. § 26b.
37. § 26b(a).
38. § 26b(b)(1).
39. § 26b(c).
 432 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:3
C. The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Development and Present
State in Professional Baseball
Baseball’s antitrust exemption status created an imbalance of
bargaining power between labor and management.40  Lacking the 
ability to address issues under the antitrust laws, many commentators 
urged the use of “concerted activity and collective bargaining as a 
countervailing force to the power of the owners.”41  In response to the 
threat of unionization in 1946, the owners created a representation 
plan that limited representation to providing a means for 
communicating players’ suggestions and complaints.42  In 1954, the 
players formed the Major League Baseball Players’ Association 
(“MLBPA”), which operated as a “conduit of information,” but 
functioned as neither a union nor a collective bargaining unit.43  The 
player representatives were given the opportunity to air their 
grievances, but were only able to wait and accept whatever action the 
club owners decided to take.44 
Gradually, the MLBPA transformed from “its earlier status as an 
information exchange group to a bona fide labor organization.”45  
After Marvin Miller was named as the executive director of the 
Association in 1966, the owners feared and despised Miller because 
he “travelled from camp to camp spreading the gospel of economic 
progress through unity.”46  Concerted union activity occurred in 1969 
when players boycotted spring training as a result of the inability of 
players and management to reach an agreement on the funding of the 
players’ pension plan.47 
Later that year, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
indirectly approved the organization’s collective bargaining status.48 
The NLRB is an independent federal agency vested with the power to 
safeguard employees’ rights to organize and to prevent unfair labor 
40. Bautista, supra note 8, at 454 (citing Erwin Kranskow & Herman Levy,
Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEO. L.J. 749, 758 (1963)). 
41. Robert McCormick, Baseball’s Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1982). 
42. Id. at 1151.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1152.
46. Jerry Crasnick, LICENSE TO DEAL: A SEASON ON THE RUN WITH A MAVERICK 
BASEBALL AGENT 132–33, (Rodale, 2005). 
47. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152.
48. Id.
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practices committed by private sector employers and unions.49  In 
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Association of 
National Baseball League Umpires,50 the NLRB held that 
professional baseball was an industry “in or affecting interstate 
commerce” and thus subject to the protections and requirements of 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).51  The NLRA provides 
that employees have a “right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”52  Additionally, it requires labor and 
management to bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of 
employment.53 
In 1972, the Players’ Association confronted the owners in the 
first test of the organization’s strength and the owners’ resolve, and 
players undertook the first industry-wide strike.54  In 1973, the players 
and owners entered into a new CBA that provided an arbitration 
system that allowed players to submit salary disputes for arbitration 
by an impartial judge.55  This agreement crippled the reserve clause, 
which allowed owners to renew the expired contract of a player for 
one year in the event that a new contract would not be reached.56 
In order to curb the momentum the players gained with the CBA 
in 1973, the owners aggressively entered the 1976 negotiations and 
struck a deal which bound players to their respective teams for six 
years.57  These negotiations resulted in a seventeen-day lockout, and 
foreshadowed the continuous conflict over player movement and 
rapidly escalating salaries.58 
Following the 1976 agreement, salaries rose sharply, and owners 
once again aggressively entered the 1981 negotiations with the 
intention of curbing salary growth.59  The owners wanted a 
compensatory system with a minimum and maximum salary for 
49. What We Do, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
50. Am. League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
51. Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. §157 (2006).
53. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
54. Id. at 1153.
55. Bautista, supra note 8, at 457.
56. Id. at 458.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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players with fewer than six years in the league, but the MLBPA 
viewed these provisions as a conspiracy against player freedom of 
movement.60  Both the owners and players maintained hard-line 
stances, and it was not until one and one-half years and two player 
strikes later that they agreed on a new CBA.61  The agreement 
featured a free agent system that compensated teams that were losing 
players via free agency while allowing player mobility.62 
Player salaries continued to rise, so the owners entered the 1985 
negotiations intending to slow the escalating rate of salary growth.63  
The owners proposed a salary cap,64 but the players opposed it and 
went on strike for two days, forcing the owners to take the salary cap 
off the negotiating table.65  Both sides eventually agreed to increase 
the minimum salary in exchange for limits on players’ opportunities 
for salary arbitration.66 
Following this 1985 agreement, the owners became frustrated 
with their inability to curb the growth of escalating player salaries.67  
They took matters into their own hands and instituted an illegal 
policy concerning free agents—collusion—that involved the 
concerted action of the owners to prevent instances of free agency.68  
The owners agreed among themselves to offer no free agent 
contracts, which was evident in the fact that after the 1985 season, 
fifty-seven free agent players out of sixty-two resigned with their 
original teams for contracts less than their original teams had 
offered.69  The players filed a grievance, and arbitrators found in their 
favor, stating that the owners violated the 1985 CBA and had to pay 
the players $280 million in damages.70  These collusive tactics 
punctuated the owners’ desire for a salary cap and their willingness to 
negotiate in bad faith to achieve their goals. 
60. Id. at 458–59.
61. Id. at 459.
62. Id. at 460.
63. Id.
64. Thomas Picher, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the
Effect on Salary Cap and Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 37 
(1997) (“Salary cap provisions in professional sports establish maximum team salaries 
based on a predetermined percentage of the defined gross revenues of the league.”). 
65. Bautista, supra note 8, at 461.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 460.
68. Thomas Hopkins, Arbitration: A Major league Effect on Players’ Salaries, 2
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 301, 314 (1992). 
69. Bautista, supra note 8, at 461.
70. Id. at 461–62.
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In negotiating the 1990 CBA, the owners continued their efforts 
to stem the ever-increasing player salaries.71  The owners wanted to 
implement a new salary system72 based on a revenue-sharing plan,73 
but the players viewed this as a form of a salary cap and rejected it.74  
Following a month-long lockout, the owners removed the salary cap 
from the negotiating table, and the two sides agreed to the players’ 
liberalized salary arbitration proposition, as well as the owners’ terms 
regarding minimum salaries.75 
Although the 1990 agreement was not set to expire for four years, 
it contained a provision that allowed either side to reopen 
negotiations after only three years.76  In December of 1992, the 
owners voted to reopen negotiations on the CBA with the players77 to 
discuss the issues of free agency, salary arbitration, and a minimum 
salary.78  After reaching an impasse following two years of 
negotiations, the players instituted a strike towards the end of the 
1994 season, and the owners cancelled the remainder of the season.79 
The dispute centered on the owners’ demand to create cost control by 
putting a limit on player payrolls.80  The strike lasted over two 
hundred days and carried through most of spring training the 
following year.81  It ended just before the start of the 1995 season 
when the NLRB sought an injunction against the owners, allowing 
the 1995 and 1996 seasons to be played under the old CBA.82 
71. Id. at 462.
72. Murray Chass, Chill of Labor Impasse Threatens Baseball’s Spring, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1990, at A26. 
73. David Jacobson, MLB’s Revenue Sharing Formula, CBSNEWS.COM, July 14,
2008, http://www.bnet.com/article/mlbs-revenue-sharing-formula/210897 (Revenue sharing 
takes money away from high-earning teams money and gives it to low-earning teams in an 
attempt to lessen the difference in the amount of money the richest teams can spend in 
comparison to the poorest teams.). 
74. Murray Chass, Negotiators Exchange Outlooks on Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1990, at 2. 
75. Murray Chass, Baseball’s Labor Dispute Settled with Compromise on Arbitration,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at 2. 
76. Id. at 1.
77. Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Vote to Reopen Labor Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1992, at 1. 
78. Bautista, supra note 8, at 463.
79. Murray Chass, No Runs, No Hits, No Errors: Baseball Goes on Strike, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at B9. 
80. Id.
81. Ryan Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements
in Professional Sports and their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 267, 271 
(2008). 
82. Id.
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In 1996, the players and owners reached an agreement with a few 
changes.  The agreement included a luxury tax that required the 
teams with the five highest payrolls to pay a 35 percent tax on the 
amount by which their payrolls exceed the threshold amount.83  It also 
implemented a revenue-sharing plan that transferred 22 percent of 
the thirteen wealthiest clubs’ local revenues to the other clubs.84  
Finally, the players and owners agreed jointly to petition Congress to 
eliminate baseball’s antitrust exemption,85 which ultimately resulted in 
the Curt Flood Act. 
In 2003, the CBA maintained many of the provisions of the 1997 
agreement.86  Under the agreement, a player could achieve free 
agency if he had “(1) fulfilled his current contract; (2) completed at 
least six years of major league service; and (3) not executed a contract 
for the next succeeding season.”87  In negotiating the agreements in 
both 1997 and 2003, there was no discussion of a salary cap, so the 
negotiations went smoothly. 
The previous CBA went into effect in 2007.88  The discussions 
were pragmatic, workmanlike, and conducted with a mutual attempt 
to reach an agreement.89  Among other things, it contained a 
revamped draft for amateur players.90  Specifically, it provided clubs 
that failed to sign their first or second round pick with the same pick 
in the subsequent year’s draft as compensation.91  Clubs that were 
unable to sign their third round pick received a sandwich pick 
between the third and fourth rounds in the subsequent year’s draft.92 
The current CBA was agreed to on November 22, 2011, and 
unanimously ratified by the owners on December 15, 2011.93  It 
continued the peaceful trend of negotiations and ensured MLB of two 
83. Daniel Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run this Game?  The Past, Present, and
Future of Major League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 364 (1999). 
84. Id. at 365.
85. Id.
86. Dryer, supra note 81, at 271.
87. Id.
88. Barry Bloom, MLB, Union Announce New Labor Deal, MLB (Oct. 25, 2006)
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061024&content_id=1722211&fext=.jsp&c_id
=mlb. 
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, MLB, Clubs Unanimously Ratify New Collective Bargaining
Agreement (Dec. 15, 2011, 5:44 PM) http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111215& 
content_id=26175840& vkey=pr_mlb&c_id=mlb. 
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decades without a labor stoppage.94  It is for a five-year term and will 
expire on December 1, 2016.95 
III. Analysis
MLB is an imperfect league.  It faces continuous challenges that 
force it to recognize problems and implement solutions.  The new 
CBA was a way for both the players and the owners to address their 
concerns and implement changes to the league. 
A. The Antitrust Exemption and Labor Law
MLB is subject to NLRA labor laws because of its exemption
from antitrust law.  The NLRA sets a low standard of behavior by 
which the owners must abide.  The labor laws under the NLRA are 
not nearly as restrictive as antitrust laws, and only require that “labor 
and management bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of 
employment.”96  Under the NLRA, cases are brought before the 
NLRB, not a court of law.97  Additionally, if players wish to protest 
unfair labor practices by the owners, they can only strike if it is lawful, 
with the issue determined by the NLRB.98 
Unlike the labor laws of the NLRA, the Sherman Act provides a 
remedy against “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States.”99  The Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combinations, or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade, but the Supreme Court interprets 
the Sherman Act only to bar agreements that unreasonably restrain 
trade.100  A plaintiff in an antitrust case must establish that a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy exists, and that it unreasonably restrains 
trade.101 
94. Ben Nicholson-Smith, CBA Details: Luxury Tax, Draft, HGH, Replay, MLB
TRADE RUMORS (Nov. 22, 2011 2:15 PM) http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/ 2011/11/cba-
details-luxury-tax-draft-.html. 
95. Press Release, MLB, MLBPA Reach New Five-Year Labor Agreement,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26025138&vkey=pr_mlb
&c_id=mlb. 
96. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
97. Employee Rights, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/ rights-we-protect/employee-rights
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
100. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
101. James McKeown, Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: to the Single
Entity and Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 365 (2009). 
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Antitrust laws hold leagues to a higher standard than labor laws. 
Under labor laws, MLB must only negotiate in good faith.  The 
antitrust exemption for the first-year amateur draft allows MLB 
owners to take actions that constitute trade restraints, so long as they 
are done in good faith.  This severely limits the challenges that the 
MLBPA can bring in court, and limits the relief that the MLBPA can 
seek.  Based on this unfair bargaining position, the owners have been 
able to take advantage of the first-year amateur draft and overpay 
rookies. 
When the Court created baseball’s antitrust exemption in Federal 
Baseball, it put professional baseball players at a severe negotiating 
disadvantage.  Although subsequent Supreme Court cases questioned 
this exemption, it was not until the Curt Flood Act that Congress 
made a concerted effort to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption.102  
As noted above, the Curt Flood Act was full of numerous exemptions 
and applied only to MLB players.103  Specifically, the Act does not 
remove the exemption from “any organized professional baseball 
amateur or first-year player draft.”104  To bring a suit challenging the 
legality of the amateur draft, a player would need to prove that the 
draft was a tool by which the owners did not bargain in good faith.105  
This has given the owners a bargaining advantage when it comes to 
changing the draft during CBA negotiations. 
B. Historical Imbalances in Signing Draft Picks
Historically, one of MLB’s biggest problems has been the
structure of the first-year amateur draft.106  It has not served the 
purpose of a well functioning “reverse order draft,” which is supposed 
to allow the worst MLB franchises to acquire the best amateur 
talent.107  Too often, the draft failed to steer the most talented 
amateur players to the clubs with the poorest on-field performance.108 
Before the implementation of the current CBA, prior to each 
draft, MLB would send a “suggested slotting” for each selection, but 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (1998).
103. § 26b.
104. § 26b(b)(1).
105. McCormick, supra note 41, at 1152–53.
106. Toms, supra note 7.
107. Id.
108. Peter Toms, Last Week in Bizball: Reforming the Amateur Draft Update, THE BIZ 
OF BASEBALL (Oct. 19, 2009) http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=3651:lwib-updates-on-reforming-the-amatuer-draft-and-revenue-
sharing &catid=67:pete-toms&Itemid=155. 
 2012] DRAFTING A SOLUTION 439
they were only suggestions.109  The draft consisted of a “stupid 
informal slotting system that nobody pa[id] attention to anyway.”110  
Some teams followed the suggestions, but others did not and sought 
permission from the Commissioner’s office to pay higher than the slot 
allotment.111 
The most notable exemptions to these suggestions were special 
players who would often drop because of “signability concerns and 
the threat that they’ll hold out for as long as it takes.”112  Smaller 
teams routinely passed on superior talent and allowed the best 
players to slip to better teams because they lacked the money to sign 
these “premium” players.113  For example, in 2001, the sixty-fourth 
and sixty-fifth picks of the draft received $625,000 and $620,000 
signing bonuses respectively, but the sixty-sixth pick received a $2 
million signing bonus.114  The sixty-sixth pick was a potential first-
round pick, but fell almost thirty slots because teams were concerned 
with their ability to sign him at such a high asking price.115 
A more recent example is Rick Porcello.116  Porcello was a highly 
rated pitcher, considered by some to be the best pitcher in the 2007 
draft, but he was not drafted until the twenty-seventh pick overall.117  
If not for being considered one of the toughest players to sign in the 
entire draft, he would have been drafted much higher, potentially 
second overall by Kansas City.118 
Unlike other major professional sports athletes, a drafted baseball 
player has the option of either signing with the team that drafted him 
or returning to school.  Even after being drafted, high school players 
may attend college if they do not sign with a MLB team.119  Often, the 
player forces the team to pay a high signing bonus at the threat of 
109. Jonathan Mayo, Slotting System Could Improve Draft, MLB (Dec. 16, 2009)
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091215&content_id=7815624&vkey=news_ml
b&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
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returning to school and the team wasting a draft pick.  MLB features 
unique characteristics in its draft that differentiate it from other major 
professional sports.  Largely, the MLB first-year amateur draft has up 
to fifty rounds.120  This is in contrast to the National Football League 
(“NFL”), which has only seven rounds,121 and the National Basketball 
League (“NBA”), which consists of only two rounds.122  Not only do 
NFL and NBA teams have to invest money in fewer picks, it also 
means that the MLB draft creates a much larger pool from which 
stars can emerge.  For example, Albert Pujols, a guaranteed first-
ballot Hall of Famer, was drafted in the thirteenth round.123  Similarly, 
Roy Oswalt, a three-time All-Star pitcher with a 159-93 win-loss 
career record,124 was drafted in the twenty-third round.125  The breadth 
of the MLB draft also gives each team more players to which it must 
devote time and resources.  With such a high number of rounds and 
players drafted, many smaller market teams have passed on players 
with signability issues in an attempt to focus on players they could 
sign for a lower amount. 
Additionally, there was a movement among veteran players to 
curtail the escalating compensation being awarded rookies and 
apportion those savings to veterans.126  Veteran players were being 
met with diminished demand for their services in the free agent 
market in terms of both contract length and value, while competition 
amongst clubs in the first-year amateur draft sharply increased.127  
Veterans believed that the money should go to big league players, not 
to rookies “who are still hanging out at the student union after 
120. First Year Player Draft: FAQ, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/faq.jsp (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
121. News: NFL draft’s first round moves to Thursday night for 2010, NAT’L 
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games.”128  A recent example is that of Steven Strasburg, the first 
overall pick in the 2010 amateur draft.129  In addition to the buzz 
created by his reported demands pre-draft, he ended up with a 
contract worth $15 million.130  For many veteran players, “giving that 
much money to a player who had yet to log a single professional 
inning was objectionable.”131  Veteran players did not want such large 
amounts of money going to “kids” who have never played a MLB 
game.132 
C. Spending Limits in the Current CBA
MLB’s number one priority in negotiations over the new CBA
was the first-year amateur draft.133  Prior to the negotiations, MLB 
created a committee to “identify existing problems and find solutions 
for them.”134  The premise that guided these committee meetings was 
that the first-year amateur draft was the best and easiest manner by 
which baseball could address the widening financial disparities.135  The 
hope is that under the new system players will get drafted when they 
should, based on their talent rather than their signability.136 
The new CBA added heavy restrictions on draft spending.137  Each 
club has a spending limit based on when it is scheduled to make its 
first ten selections.138  The team with the first pick will have a limit of 
$11.5 million, and the team selecting last will have a limit of $4.5 
million.139  Bonuses after the tenth round don’t count against the limit, 
unless the bonus exceeds $100,000.140 
There are strict penalties to enforce the spending limits and 
reduce draft spending.  Teams that spend more than 5 percent over-
128. Stark, supra note 110.
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1:49PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111201&content_id=26066708&vkey 
=news_mlb&c_id=mlb. 
137. Nicholson-Smith, supra note 94.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
 442 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:3
slot on the draft will face a 75 percent tax.141  Teams that go over slot 
by five to ten percent face a 75 percent tax and the loss of a first 
round draft pick.142  Teams that go over slot by ten to fifteen percent 
face a 100 percent tax and the loss of a first and second round draft 
pick.143  Teams that exceed slot by 15 percent or more face a 100 
percent tax and the loss of first round draft picks in the next two 
drafts.144  Proceeds from the tax will go to clubs that did not over-
spend, and forfeited draft picks will be distributed via a lottery.145 
Additionally, the CBA contains a competitive balance lottery to 
give low-revenue teams additional draft picks.146  The ten clubs with 
the lowest revenues and the ten clubs in the smallest markets are 
eligible to win one of six draft choices that will be added after the first 
round, with the teams’ chances of winning the lottery depending on 
their winning percentage in the previous season.147  The teams that do 
not win additional picks and all other teams that qualify under the 
revenue sharing plan will be eligible for a second lottery for six more 
picks after the second round.148  Unlike other draft picks, teams can 
trade these picks.149  MLB hopes that these new rules will curb 
spending on the first-year draft and restore the competitive balance. 
D. Consequences of the New CBA
Although there has not been a draft since the current CBA’s
implementation, there has been negative reaction to the new amateur 
spending limits.150  Some believe the new rules will continue to keep 
small-market teams down and have an adverse effect on teams trying 
to build through the minor leagues.151  They believe that building 
through the draft will continue to be the most cost-effective way to 
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construct a team, but smart teams will now have a harder time using 
their aggressiveness to their advantage.152 
There is also a belief that the new rules concerning the first-year 
player draft will have an impact on prep athletes.153  Some believe that 
these restrictions are likely to negatively impact the number of high 
school players that ultimately choose pro baseball.154  High school 
draftees will not be able to hold out for as much bonus money as in 
past years, so they will likely head to college rather than starting their 
professional careers.155  One scouting director believes that it will take 
more money to sign the top talents, leaving less money for the later 
draft picks in the first ten rounds.156  Little is known at this point, but 
there is not much optimism that the new rules will balance the 
spending power in MLB. 
IV. Proposal: Implementing a Hard-Slotted Salary System
Although the limits of the new CBA are a step in the right
direction, this note proposes that MLB go further in the next CBA 
and implement a hard-slotted system for the first-year amateur 
draft.157  In drafting the new CBA, the league may have sought a 
system of hard-slotting, but eventually found traction on a 
compromise of an overall draft tax for exceeding the limits.158  In the 
world of labor compromise, the union’s willingness to limit draft 
expenditures might as well have been a trade-off for revamping the 
draft-pick compensation system for free agents.159  The problem is that 
the new spending limits won’t prohibit over-slot spending.160 
A hard-slotting system is required to level the playing field. 
Slotting refers to “the bonus a player gets, or should get, dependent 
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on when he’s taken in the draft.”161  A player receives a set amount 
based on the overall number of the pick where he is selected, similar 
to the hard slotting salary structure of the NBA.162  Under the NBA’s 
CBA, each rookie scale contract between a team and first round pick 
covers a two-year period, with team options for both the third and 
fourth seasons.163  Each rookie contract must be at least 80 percent of 
the applicable rookie scale amount in current base compensation, but 
the total of salary and bonuses cannot exceed 120 percent of the 
applicable rookie scale amount.164 
A hard slotted draft salary structure would completely remove the 
imbalance in drafting.  Under the current CBA, the top picks can 
demand more money from the pool, leaving teams with little room to 
stay within the limits of the first ten rounds.  A slotted salary structure 
would tell amateurs what to expect specifically based on where they 
are selected.  Instead of giving a team limits based on the first ten 
rounds, it would place a limit on each individual pick.  Placing a hard 
structure on each individual pick would moderate overspending on 
draft picks and curb the outrageous demands of young players who 
believe they deserve more than they are worth.165  This would benefit 
the small-market teams who would no longer have to pass on top 
prospects demanding an exorbitant signing bonus. 
With the new spending limits, there is concern that more 
prospects will attend college instead of signing with a MLB team. 
Ultimately, this would benefit MLB because more players would 
enter the draft with experience and maturity.  It would give teams a 
better sense of the quality of a player and help justify drafting him 
with a top pick.  Although some players might still decide to pursue 
other sports, in the end, the players who want to play, who have a 
passion to pursue a Major League career, will sign.166  When they’re 
11 and 12, they do not say, ‘I want to grow up to be a Major League 
Baseball player, but only for a large bonus.”167 
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V. Conclusion
Disparities among salaries in baseball created a need for action. 
Over the years, attempts to implement a salary cap have failed, 
culminating in the worst work stoppage in baseball history in 1994.  In 
December 2011, MLB implemented a new CBA with spending limits 
on the first-year amateur draft.  The spending limits are a step in the 
right direction, but they do not fully solve MLB’s problems. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such a structure will be implemented 
in the next CBA.  The new spending limits were a contentious point 
in negotiations and reportedly delayed the signing of the new CBA.168  
Constraints on a free market often come with resistance, and that is 
no different in the MLB’s CBA negotiations.  Although future CBAs 
may not adopt a hard slotted salary system any time soon, it would 
even the playing field in baseball, and give the small-market teams a 
competitive chance. 
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